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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GROVE L. FLOWER, : Case No. 930566-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Grove L. Flower relies on his opening 
brief and refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the summary of 
the argument. Appellant responds to the State's brief as 
follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Flower's claim that the State did not establish that the 
consent was attenuated from the illegalities is properly before 
this Court. The trial court ruled on this issue as evidenced by 
the Findings and Conclusions which include a determination that 
the consent "was sufficiently attenuated from the protective 
sweep." In addition, although the State had the burden of 
establishing that the agents had not exploited the illegality, it 
failed to make any attenuation argument in the trial court. 
Furthermore, Defendant adequately raised the issue when he argued 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 
The State failed to establish that the illegalities and 
consent were attenuated. All three Thurman/Arroyo factors weigh 
against attenuation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ATTENUATION ARGUMENT IS PROPERLY 
PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
The State argues the attenuation issue is not properly 
before the Court on appeal because "Defendant's trial court 
argument hinged on a fruit of the poisonous tree 'but for' 
analysis" and " [t]he Utah Supreme Court has specifically eschewed 
the 'but for' test." State's brief at 17. The State's waiver 
argument is without merit for three reasons. 
First, the counsel drafted Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") include an 
express conclusion that "[t]he initial consent given by the 
defendant to search the safe when he was contacted in the front 
yard of the house was sufficiently attenuated from the protective 
sweep." R. 310 (emphasis added); see Addendum B to Appellant's 
opening brief. The Findings and Conclusions also explicitly 
state that "[t]he subsequent consent given by the defendant after 
his arrest and after his Miranda rights had been given to him was 
attenuated from the protective sweep . . . ." R. 310 (emphasis 
added). Although counsel drafted the Findings and Conclusions, 
the trial judge adopted the conclusions when he signed them.1 
1
 Although this Court is free to disregard counsel drafted 
findings (see Appellant's opening brief at 13-14), where the 
findings and conclusions drafted by the State include a 
determination on an issue which the State later claims was waived, 
fairness and common sense require a recognition that the parties 
and judge knew the issue was before the court. Under such 
circumstances, this Court should not consider the issue waived. 
See generally State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) 
2 
It is well settled that where the trial court is given an 
opportunity to decide an issue, takes evidence and issues a 
ruling on the merits, that issue is properly preserved for 
appeal. See State v. Belcrard, 830 P.2d 264 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1053; State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
Although the State suggests that Defendant had an 
opportunity to later present an attenuation argument (State's 
brief at 19), the existence of a ruling on that issue, as 
evidenced by the signed Findings and Conclusions, made further 
argument unnecessary. After losing on a motion, a party is not 
required to renew that issue in order to properly preserve the 
issue for appeal. Indeed, counsel who renews issues already 
resolved by the trial judge is in danger of receiving a busy 
trial judge's wrath. In this case where the written Findings and 
Conclusions include conclusions on the attenuation issue, that 
issue is properly preserved for appellate review. 
Second, the State has the burden of establishing that any 
consent "was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct." 
State v. Ham, 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 47 (Utah App. 1996) (citing 
United States v. Melendrez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 
1984). In this case, the State did not make any written or oral 
argument that the taint of the police misconduct was sufficiently 
attenuated to allow admission of the evidence seized from the 
(Supreme Court reviewed issue on appeal which trial court had ruled 
on); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1994) (this Court 
reviewed issue where trial court acted on motion). 
3 
safe. See R. 39-49, 291-305. Even after the trial judge told 
the parties that he was going to suppress the evidence found in 
the room and the lunchbox, the prosecutor made no argument that 
the police misconduct was sufficiently attenuated to allow 
admission of the contents of the safe. R. 301-302, 303-306. 
Under these circumstances, where the State had the burden of 
proving that attenuation dissipated the taint, any waiver which 
occurred based on the arguments in the trial court is 
attributable to the State, which made no argument that the taint 
was dissipated. Where the State had the burden of establishing 
that the prior illegalities and subsequent consent were 
attenuated and made no attempt to so argue, any failure by 
Defendant to argue attenuation does not waive Defendant's claim 
on appeal that the illegality was not attenuated from the 
consent. 
Third, Flower adequately raised the attenuation argument 
so as to preserve it for appellate review. In his memorandum in 
support of his motion to suppress, Flower argued that the 
exclusionary rule required that all evidence be suppressed as the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree." R. 35. At the hearing, he 
argued that the illegal conduct precluded admission of the 
evidence subsequently obtained from the safe. R. 2 99. 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I think the 
chronology in this incident is extremely 
important, and also the doctrine of the fruit of 
the poisonous tree is very important because once 
we find any illegal misconduct that violated 
fourth amendment rights, or [the Utah 
constitution] and as a result of the illegal 
violation where something is discovered that's 
4 
incriminating, everything they found after any 
illegal 
The Court: I don't agree with that 
philosophy. As heretofore stated, the defendant 
in this case gave his consent, after having his 
rights read to him, to go into the safe. 
Defense Counsel: Correct. Your Honor, how 
did they get to the point of asking him what was 
in the safe? How did they find the safe? 
R. 2 99. As can be seen from this exchange, the trial judge 
initially cut off defense counsel when counsel began to argue 
that the taint of the illegality was not dissipated. Defense 
counsel responded by pointing out factually that the officers 
knew about the safe and got to the point of asking about the safe 
based on their prior illegal acts. R. 299. While defense 
counsel did use the "but for" language challenged by the State in 
his memorandum, he also relied on the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine in that memorandum and in oral argument. R. 35, 299, 
301-2. 
The attenuation analysis outlined in State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 
(Utah 1993), is based on the exclusionary rule and the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine embraced in Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). See 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690. In Arroyo, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
The basis for the second part of the two-
part analysis is found in the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
5 
(1963), which stated that a trial court must 
determine in such a case "'whether granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the 
evidence to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality 
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable 
to be purged of the primary taint.'11 371 U.S. at 
488, 83 S.Ct. at 417 (quoting Maguire, Evidence 
of Guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to 
invalidate consents which, despite being 
voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation of a 
prior police illegality. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690 (emphasis added). See also Thurman. 846 
P.2d at 12 72-75. By arguing that the consent was "the fruit of 
the poisonous tree," defense counsel preserved his attenuation 
argument under Arroyo and Thurman because such attenuation 
analysis is based on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 
Flower's claim that the connection between the prior 
illegalities and the consent was not so attenuated as to validate 
the search was preserved for appellate review in this case where 
(1) the trial judge ruled on the attenuation issue; (2) the State 
had the burden of establishing attenuation and made no argument 
that the connection between the illegalities and subsequent 
consent was attenuated; and (3) defense counsel argued that the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine precluded admission of the 
items seized from the safe.2 
2
 In addition, if this Court were to determine that defense 
counsel should have done a better job of arguing attenuation, it 
nevertheless should reach this issue under the doctrine of plain 
error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Plain error occurs 
where the error is obvious and is harmful to the defendant. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Both Arroyo and 
Thurman were decided prior to the hearing in this case. Because 
those cases indicate that an attenuation analysis is required and 
suggest that the consent in this case was not attenuated, the error 
6 
POINT II. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT ANY 
CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED 
FROM THE ILLEGALITIES. 
(Reply to Point III of Appellee's Brief) 
In a situation similar to that in the present case, this 
Court held that the defendant's consent was obtained by the 
police exploitation of the prior illegal conduct. State v. Ham, 
281 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47. In Ham, this Court pointed out that 
the State has a heavier burden when a claimed consent follows 
police misconduct because "the State must also establish the 
existence of intervening factors which prove that the consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct." Ham, 281 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 (citing United States v. Melendrez-Gonzalez, 
727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1984)). This Court determined that 
should have been obvious to the trial judge. The error prejudiced 
Flower since the judge denied the portion of his motion to suppress 
which dealt with the items in the safe. Had the judge concluded 
that the illegality and consent were not attenuated, such items 
would have been suppressed. As set forth more fully in Point II of 
Appellant's opening brief, the State did not establish that the 
consent was attenuated from the illegalities. 
Ineffective assistance occurs where a lawyer provides 
deficient performance which falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and such deficient performance results in prejudice 
to his/her client. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Prejudice 
has been defined as "but for counsel's deficient performance there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial could 
have been different." State v. Smith, 909 P. 2d 236, 243 (Utah 
1995). Assuming this Court requires an attenuation argument which 
tracks Arroyo/Thurman in order to preserve this issue for appeal, 
counsel performed deficiently in failing to make such an argument. 
Utah case law existed at the time of this trial which articulated 
specific fruit of the poisonous tree language for the consent 
context. Failure to argue that language from controlling case law 
was deficient. This failure resulted in prejudice to Flower since 
the trial judge admitted the items found in the safe. As set forth 
more fully in Appellant's opening brief and Point II of this brief, 
the illegalities were not attenuated from the consent. 
7 
the illegality and consent were not attenuated: 
The record shows that a very short time period 
had expired between the initial illegal search 
and the second "request" for a consent to search. 
Additionally, absolutely no intervening events 
occurred; defendant's consent was procured during 
the ongoing illegal search. Finally, the agents 
were obviously seeking evidence demonstrating 
that defendant had violated his probation 
agreement and were apparently unconcerned with 
the provision of defendant's probation agreement 
requiring reasonable suspicion. 
Although the State recognizes in the present case that it 
did not cross-appeal, the State appears to be making an end run 
attack on the trial judge's rulings that the protective sweep and 
search of the lunchbox violated the Fourth Amendment. See 
footnotes 5 and 6 of State's brief at 20-21, discussion at 20-23 
of State's brief. As the State concedes, by failing to appeal 
these rulings, the State cannot contest the propriety of those 
determinations as part of its appeal. Nor can it properly ask 
this Court to reassess those determinations at this juncture. 
The conclusion that the protective sweep and lunchbox search 
violated the Fourth Amendment must therefore stand. See State v. 
South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994) (State cannot argue on 
appeal that search warrant was valid where it did not cross-
appeal on that issue).3 
The State suggests that the purpose and flagrancy prong 
weighs in favor of attenuation because the protective sweep "was 
not glaringly abusive." State's brief at 24. The State claims 
3
 In addition, the State has not fully briefed its claim that 
the protective sweep and lunchbox search were valid. In the 
absence of full briefing, those rulings must stand. 
8 
that the sweep was close to the line of permissibility because 
the officers conducted the sweep based on a previous circumstance 
where Kelly apparently had not informed officers that someone 
else was in the house. The officers did not present information 
that on that previous occasion, the individual in the house had 
endangered the officers. See R. 128-29, 169. Nor did the State 
present any information that on this occasion, they had a 
reasonable belief that there were persons on the premises who 
posed a danger to officers or others. In order to conduct a 
valid warrantless sweep in conjunction with an arrest, officers 
must have a reasonable belief that there are persons on the 
premises who pose a danger to the officers or others. See 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
The general safety claim made by the State in this case 
could be made in almost any case where a defendant has a prior 
criminal record, and does not rise to the constitutionally 
required reasonable belief. The parole agents in this case often 
conduct home visits and are charged with knowledge of the 
requirements for searching a home. In the absence of facts 
demonstrating a reasonable belief that at the time of entry, 
dangerous persons were on the premises, the violation of the 
Fourth Amendment should have been apparent to the officers. 
In addition, the spontaneity of the search demonstrates 
that the officers did not have a reasonable belief that they were 
in danger. Although they knew about the prior incident with 
Kelly before going to the house, they did not discuss any plan 
9 
for protection. Since no further facts arose suggesting that 
there might be dangerous persons on the premises, the officers' 
spontaneous decision suggests that they did not have a reasonable 
belief they were endangered. While officers are at times 
required to take "prompt, unplanned action," not all prompt, 
unplanned actions are constitutionally permissible. In this case 
where nothing about the facts suggested that the officers were 
endangered on this occasion, the spontaneous action does not 
establish a reasonable belief that there were persons on the 
premises who posed a danger to the officers. 
The State also claims that since the officers did not 
know Flower lived in the house when they did the sweep, "it is 
difficult to see how suppression of the evidence related to the 
defendant would deter the police conduct that the trial court 
found unlawful." State's brief at 24. An improper sweep of a 
house can turn up all types of evidence. Suppressing evidence 
that officers attempt to use in any case, not just the case 
against the person initially targeted, has an obvious deterrent 
effect. If this Court were to say that evidence against Kelly 
would be suppressed but not evidence against any other defendant, 
officers would be encouraged to make protective sweeps in all 
cases, hoping that the evidence located would implicate 
associates of the target person. 
The misconduct to be deterred is not only the automatic 
sweep of the house in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that 
the officers were in danger, but also the searching into nooks, 
10 
the officers' actions in holding the house for two hours in an 
attempt to gain further evidence based on what was found during 
the illegal sweep, and the agents' actions in showing scales 
found during the sweep to each other an hour after the sweep 
without first obtaining a warrant. In this case, where the 
officers had no information supporting a reasonable belief that 
persons posing a danger were in the house, the purpose and 
flagrancy prong weigh in favor of suppression. 
The temporal proximity prong also weighs in favor of 
suppression. The officers did not leave the premises after the 
illegal sweep. They enveloped Flower when he arrived and 
immediately questioned him based on items they found during the 
illegal sweep. Unlike Thurman, Flower had not been in the 
presence of the officers for several hours, and the effects on 
Flower of the illegal sweep did not have time to dissipate. As 
soon as Flower became aware of the sweep, the agents made it 
clear that they wanted to know what was in the safe they found 
during the course of that illegal sweep. Furthermore, the 
officers continued in their illegal activities by searching the 
lunchbox. 
Finally, the State argues that Flower's conduct in 
responding to the agent's query that he "would sure like to know 
what was in the lunchbox" and the administration of Miranda 
warnings were intervening circumstances. Both of these claims, 
if endorsed by this Court, could essentially swallow the 
intervening circumstances requirement. 
11 
First, the wording of the agent's query called for a 
response. A statement does not need to be made in the form of a 
question in order to constitute questioning or interrogation. 
See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 
L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Any "words or actions that are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response" are considered 
interrogation. Id. The agent obviously made the statement that 
"he sure would like to know what was in that safe" in an effort 
to evoke a response and consent to search from Flower. The 
illegal search led directly to the agent's statement regarding 
the contents of the safe and lunchbox. Flower's honest response 
to the agent's inquisitiveness was not an independent intervening 
circumstance. Rather, it was the direct response to the 
officer's attempt to elicit a response. 
Second, the State argues that the Miranda warnings were 
an intervening circumstance prior to the second consent. State's 
brief at 27. Flower actually invoked his right to silence. The 
fact that officers continued to question him after he had invoked 
the right would necessarily cause a defendant to perceive the 
officers as refusing to recognize his invocation. An affirmative 
response following a request for consent after a defendant 
invoked his right to silence does not constitute an independent 
intervening circumstance. Indeed, the State provides no case law 
in support of its claim that the Miranda warnings are an 
intervening circumstance. 
In conclusion, all three of the Arroyo/Thurman factors 
12 
weigh in favor of suppression. The State failed to establish 
that the illegalities were attenuated from the consent. The 
trial judge therefore erred in refusing to suppress the items 
seized from the safe. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Flower respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this <^ £k day of March, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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